Straining The Limits of Philosophy: Aquinas on the Immortality of the Human Soul by Farmer, Linda L.
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 20 Issue 2 Article 5 
4-1-2003 
Straining The Limits of Philosophy: Aquinas on the Immortality of 
the Human Soul 
Linda L. Farmer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Farmer, Linda L. (2003) "Straining The Limits of Philosophy: Aquinas on the Immortality of the Human 
Soul," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 20 : Iss. 2 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol20/iss2/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
STRAINING THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY: 
AQUINAS ON THE IMMORTALITY 
OF THE HUMAN SOUL 
Linda L. Farmer 
It is customary in the literature on Aquinas to hear mention, critiques, and 
defenses of Aquinas's "proofs of the human soul's immortality." Such do 
not, at least technically, exist. Aquinas's conclusions of the proofs in ques-
tion always and only conclude that the human soul is incorruptible. The 
question this paper is concerned with is whether the distinction between 
'incorruptibility' and 'immortality' prohibits us from considering Aquinas's 
arguments for the soul's incorruptibility to be, as we are already so habitu-
ated to claim, arguments for the immortality of the human soul. To answer 
that question, we attempt to extend Aquinas's two main philosophical 
demonstrations of the human soul's incorruptibility to immortality without 
violating any of Aquinas's philosophical principles. What we find is that 
this cannot be done and that, for Aquinas, the immortality of the human 
soul can only be theologically demonstrated. 
Aquinas never demonstrates the immortality of the human soul. In fact, he 
never even offers philosophical arguments in support of such a thesis. Each 
of Aquinas's so-called arguments for the soul's immortality concludes that 
the soul is incorruptible, not that it is immortal. This fact is commonly unac-
knowledged in the literature,! perhaps because the terms 'incorruptibility' 
and 'immortality' are considered to be synonymous or, at least, inter-
changeable. These two notions are, however, formally distinct: 'incorrupt-
ibility' refers to being/existence, 'immortality' to life/vital activity. What is 
the significance of this distinction? Does it prohibit us from considering 
Aquinas's arguments for the soul's incorruptibility to be, as we are already 
so habituated to claim, arguments for the immortality of the human soul? 
To address these questions, we shall first examine Aquinas's use of the 
concepts 'immortality' and 'incorruptibility', particularly in his arguments 
concerned with whether physical death destroys the soul. As those argu-
ments conclude that the soul is incorruptible, we shall then examine 
whether Aquinas's two main types of arguments for the soul's incorrupt-
ibility can be extended in such a way as to demonstrate the soul's immor-
tality. The conclusion we shall reach is that Aquinas's philosophical com-
mitments place him in a very awkward situation with respect to the 
immortality of the human soul, namely, that he can philosophically main-
tain that the human soul will continue to exist after physical death but not 
that it will be actually alive in the separated state. 
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1. Terminological and Conceptual Considerations 
It is not surprising that we are, generally speaking, in the habit of saying 
that Aquinas argues for the immortality of the human soul. For the ques-
tion Aquinas poses before an argument concerned with whether physical 
death destroys the soul may explicitly concern immortality rather than 
incorruptibility;2 and, perhaps more importantly, Aquinas frequently uses 
the notions 'immortality' and 'incorruptibility' interchangeably.3 
Given these facts one would reasonably expect to find the terminology 
of immortality in at least one of Aquinas's arguments concerning whether 
the soul is destroyed at physical death. This is, however, glaringly not the 
case. Aquinas consistently and exclusively uses the terminology of incor-
ruptibility in the conclusion of those arguments: 
We must assert that the intellectual principle which we call the 
human soul is incorruptible.4 
Now, from what has just been said it is clearly shown that every 
intellectual substance is incorruptible.s 
It must be stated that it is necessary that a human soul be totally 
incorruptible.6 
It is tempting to assume that Aquinas does not consciously avoid using 
the terminology of immortality and, thereby, does not consciously avoid 
arguing the claim that the soul is immortal. However, one of Aquinas's 
own statements undermines the legitimacy of such an assumption: "if the 
resurrection of the body be denied it is not easy, in fact it is difficult, to 
maintain the immortality of the soul".7 
If, then, 'incorruptibility' and 'immortality' are interchangeable notions, 
as the literature on Aquinas apparently assumes,B why does Aquinas say 
that it is difficult to, not just demonstrate, but maintain the soul's immortality 
without the support of the truth of faith that the body will be resurrected? 
Does not Aquinas unflinching stand behind his philosophical demonstra-
tions of the incorruptibility of the soul? Clearly, the problem rests in the 
assumption that 'incorruptibility' and 'immortality' are fundamentally 
interchangeable notions. 
The formal distinction between those notions, as we mentioned earlier, 
is that 'incorruptibility' refers to being/ existence, whereas 'immortality' 
refers to life/vital activity. To claim, then, that the human soul is incorrupt-
ible is to claim that its being/existence (esse) cannot be destroyed with the 
corruption of the composite (viz., the human being); and to claim that the 
human soul is immortal is to claim that the soul's life is not destroyed with 
the corruption of the composite. Aquinas argues for the first, but believes 
that the latter, as we just saw, requires the support of a truth of faith. To 
understand why, we need to determine what significant differences exist 
between the two claims. We can achieve this by attempting to substitute 
the 'difficult to maintain' claim that the soul is immortal in Aquinas's argu-
ments for the incorruptibility of the human soul and seeing what sorts of 
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difficulties, if any, that would give rise to in Aquinas's philosophical 
anthropology. 
II. Aquinas's Arguments for Incorruptibility 
Aquinas argues for the incorruptibility of the human soul in two main 
ways: from the principle 'nothing can be separated from itself'; and from 
the immateriality of the human intellect." Let us consider each of these in 
turn to see whether they can be extended to the claim that the human 
soul's life is not destroyed with the corruption of the composite. 
(i) The argument for incorruptibility from the principle 'nothing 
can be separated from itself' 
The argument from the principle 'nothing can be separated from itself' sets 
forth that the soul's act of being (esse) cannot be corrupted by physical 
death because it is consequent upon the soul in virtue of itself; and what 
belongs to something in virtue of itself is inseparable from it: 
Now it was shown above that the souls of brutes are not self-subsis-
tent, whereas the human soul is, so that the souls of brutes are cor-
rupted, when their bodies are corrupted, while the human soul could 
not be corrupted unless it were corrupted in itself. [ ... ] For it is clear 
that what belongs to a thing by virtue of the thing itself is inseparable 
from it. But being belongs to a form, which is an act, by virtue of 
itself. And thus, matter acquires actual being according as it acquires 
form; while it is corrupted so far as the form is separated from it. But 
it is impossible for a subsistent form to cease to exist.lD 
The naturally incorruptibility of the human soul is assured, according to 
Aquinas, because the act of being (esse) by which a human being exists does 
not properly belong to the composite of soul and matter but, rather, to the 
soul which animates that matter. This distinguishes human beings from all 
other animate beings, whose esse properly belongs to the composite of their 
soul and matter, not to their souls alone. It also ensures, through the princi-
ple 'nothing can be separated from itself', the continued existence of the 
human soul after its separation from the matter with which it was united. 
Can this argument for the incorruptibility of the human soul be extend-
ed, in a manner consistent with Aquinas's philosophical principles, to the 
immortality of the human soul? The argument would take something like 
the following form: the soul's life cannot be corrupted by physical death 
because it is consequent upon the soul in virtue of itself; and what belongs 
to something in virtue of itself is inseparable from it. So, does or can 
Aquinas maintain that life is consequent upon the soul in virtue of itself? 
While it is clear that, according to Aquinas, the soul is in virtue of itself 
the cause of life, this is insufficient to ensure the immortality of the soul 
from the principle 'nothing can be separated from itself'. As it stands, the 
argument allows us to conclude only that the soul cannot cease to be the 
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cause of life, not that soul cannot cease to be actually living. To be the cause of 
some perfection is not necessarily equivalent to possessing that perfection 
in act. For example, the human soul is the formal, efficient, and final cause 
of the human body but is not itself a body.l1 Moreover, the human soul is 
the cause of all of the sensitive perfections of human beings but does not, 
according to Aquinas, possess any sensitive perfection in act in the separat-
ed stateY Furthermore, the souls of plants and non-human animals are also 
the cause of their life, but the immortality of those types of souls is denied 
by Aquinas.13 
For the desired conclusion that the human soul possesses life in act in 
the separated state, it would need to be the case that the soul possesses life 
in virtue of itself, not merely that it is the cause of life in virtue of itself. For 
it is not because the human soul is the cause of being that it is incorruptible 
--otherwise, the souls and animals and plants as well as every sort of sub-
stantial form would be incorruptible- but, rather, because the human soul 
is itself the subject of the act of being (esse). As the substantial form of the 
body, the soul, of course, makes the body to be in act but it is only because 
it is itself the subject of esse that, in separation from the body, it is actually 
in being. 
Does, then, the human soul possess life in the way that it possesses esse, 
viz. in virtue of itself? Is the human soul, rather than the human composite 
of soul and matter, the proper subject of the perfection of life? Unless 
Aquinas was mistaken in asserting that the immortality of the soul is diffi-
cult to maintain without the resurrection of the body, it must be the case 
that the human soul is not the proper subject of the perfection of life. 
Otherwise, immortality is demonstrated by Aquinas inasmuch and insofar 
as incorruptibility is. Consequently, there would be no reason for him to be 
any less confident in the philosophical demonstrability of immortality than 
he was of the demonstrability of the soul's incorruptibility. 
Yet, there are passages in Aquinas's works in which he seems to main-
tain that life and esse are possessed by the human soul in the same manner. 
For example, in the fourteenth question of his Quaestiones de anima, the fol-
lowing objection is raised: 
[ ... J Augustine says that just as God is the life of a soul, so a soul is the 
life of its body.[uJ But death is the privation of life; hence by death a 
soul is deprived of life and destroyed. IS 
To which Aquinas replies: 
A soul is said to be the form of its body insofar as it is the cause of 
life, just as the form is the principle of existing. For in beings which 
are alive, their 'to live' is their 'to be', as the Philosopher says in Book 
II of the De anima.'6 
This text, however, seems to allow for two different interpretations. 
Aquinas may, on the one hand, be saying that life is possessed by the soul 
in the same way as the act of being is possessed. Or on the other hand, he 
may only be saying here that the cause of the body's being and life is one 
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and the same (i.e. the soul) and, consequently, that just as the soul as cause 
of being is not corrupted by physical death, so neither is the soul as cause of 
life [or, for that matter, as cause of all other perfections (corporeity, sensitiv-
ity, etc.)] corrupted by physical death. 
Although the text is ambiguous on this point, the second interpretation 
seems more contextually appropriate. For, in saying that "the soul is the 
form of the body insofar as it is the cause of life, just as the form is the prin-
ciple of existence," the similarity drawn between life and being is in terms 
of the soul as cause (cause of life I cause of existence). 
Furthermore, had Aquinas wanted to say that the soul possesses life and 
being in the same way rather than just say that the soul is the cause of both 
the body's being and life, he could simply have restricted the statement "in 
beings which are alive, their to live is their to be" to subsistent forms, say-
ing instead "in subsistent beings, their to live is their to be." For, the cause 
of the being and life of animals and plants is their soul, but the souls of ani-
mals and plants are not subsistent: their act of being (esse) is properly pos-
sessed by the composite and, consequently, corruptible. Moreover, to be 
even less ambiguous, Aquinas could have simply said that "the life of the 
human soul is its being." 
That Aquinas only believed that the soul is the cause of life but not of 
itself actually alive in the same way that it is of itself actually in being can 
be supported by the fact that, in at least one work, his De immortalitate ani-
mae,'7 Aquinas himself rejects the demonstration of the soul's immortality 
from the fact that the soul is the cause of life and "nothing can be separat-
ed from itself."'S He does so because "the reasons for immortality [must] 
be taken from what is proper to the human soul amongst other souls, 
namely, intellection" .'9 
Although he does not reject that argument because it is not the case that 
the being and life of the human soul are possessed in act in the same way 
(and not just that they are caused by the same principle), the fact that he 
requires that "the reasons for immortality be taken from what is proper to 
the human soul amongst other souls" is strongly indicative. For, it is not 
proper to the human soul to be the cause of life -the souls of all animate 
beings are equally the cause of life- and, consequently, the argument that 
the human soul is immortal because it is the cause of life (and 'nothing can 
be separated from itself') must be rejected, as, it equally applies to the souls 
of animals and plants but, the souls of animals and plants are absolutely 
not, at least in Aquinas's opinion, immortal.20 
If, however, Aquinas believes that being and life are not merely caused 
by the same principle but possessed in act in the same way, he would not 
need to reject the argument as such because, with this premise "being and 
life are possessed in act in the same way," the argument would only con-
clude to the immortality of the human soul, not to that of every sort of soul. 
For, if "being and life are possessed in act in the same way" and, in plants 
and animals, being is possessed in act by the composite, the life of plants 
and animals would be corrupted with the corruption of the composite just 
as their being is corrupted. However, if "being and life are possessed in act 
in the same way" and being is properly possessed in act by the human soul 
rather than the composite (as Aquinas maintains), then the soul could not 
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cease to be alive in act with the corruption of the composite, just as it can-
not cease to be actually in being when the composite is corrupted. 
There are, as we have just seen, good reasons to think that Aquinas does 
not set forth that life is possessed by the human soul in virtue of itself. Our 
reasons for thinking that will become even more compelling when we con-
sider his argument for incorruptibility from the immateriality of the intel-
lect, which we will do next. However, that Aquinas's argument for incor-
ruptibility based on the principle "nothing can be separated from itself" 
cannot be extended to immortality based on the fact that the soul is the 
cause of life needs no further evidence: it is insufficient just in itself to con-
clude that the human soul (and only the human soul) is immortal and, fur-
ther, Aquinas himself rejects this type of argument for immortality. 
(ii) The argument for incorruptibility from the immateriality of the 
human intellect 
The second main type of argument Aquinas offers for the incorruptibility 
of the human soul is from the immateriality of the human intellect. 
According to this argument, the human soul must be incorruptible because 
it has an essential operation, viz. intellection, in which the body does not 
share. Intelligence of universals by the human intellect requires, according 
to Aquinas, that the human intellect be neither itself a body nor utilize a 
corporeal organ in its operation. This operative independence of the 
human soul, however, can only be explained by a corresponding indepen-
dence in the order of being. For this reason, the soul must be a subsistent 
substantial form (i.e., itself the subject of the act of being) and, consequent-
ly, cannot lose its being through the corruption of the composite.21 
If the operative independence of the soul in intellection can serve to 
demonstrate the incorruptibility of the human soul, could it not also serve 
to demonstrate the immortality of the human soul? If our intellective 
power is not, as Aquinas argues, the act of any corporeal organ and our 
soul is subsistent (itself the subject of the act of being), would it not be the 
case that our soul could and would exercise a vital activity in separation 
from the body (namely, intellection) and, therefore, be alive in act? 
Unfortunately, there is a serious difficulty involved in attempting to 
extend Aquinas's philosophical demonstration of incorruptibility from the 
immateriality of the intellect to the immortality of the human soul. 
Although it is true that our intellective power is not the act of any corpore-
al organ, phantasms are required for any human thinking. If the intellec-
tive power of the soul, while being immaterial, yet objectively depends on 
phantasms in order to think/know, would it not then be impossible for the 
human soul to exercise its power of intellection in separation from the cor-
poreal organs in which phantasms reside? 
To solve this difficulty Aquinas argues that the soul will have a different 
mode of understanding when separated from its body. He posits that a 
separated soul has a different mode of being than a soul united to its body 
and, consequently, as the mode of action in every agent follows from the 
mode of its being, the mode of understanding of a separated soul will dif-
fer from that of a soul in a state of union with the body. Rather than tum to 
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phantasms (which is the mode of understanding proper to the human 
soul), the separated soul will, according to Aquinas, tum to pure intelligi-
bles (which is the mode of understanding proper to separate substances): 
[ ... ] we must consider that nothing acts except so far as it is actual, 
and therefore the mode of action in every agent follows from the 
mode of its being. Now the soul has one mode of being when in the 
body, and another when apart from it, though its nature remains the 
same. [ ... ] The soul, therefore, when united to the body, consistently 
with that mode of being, has a mode of understanding by turning to 
corporeal phantasms, which are in corporeal organs; but when it is 
separated from the body, it has a mode of understanding by turning 
to the pure intelligibles, as is proper to other separate substances.22 
Nevertheless, as it is natural for the soul to understand by abstracting 
from phantasms23 and death does not change the nature of the soul, the 
separated soul's mode of understanding (namely, turning pure intelligi-
bles rather than to phantasms) is, according to Aquinas, unnatural 
(praeter naturam): 
[ ... ] it is as natural for the soul to understand by turning to the phan-
tasms, as it is for it to be joined to the body. But to be separated from 
the body is not in accordance with its nature, and likewise to under-
stand without turning to the phantasms is not natural to it.24 
Accordingly, then, the soul is unable to think/know in any natural way 
apart from its body and, consequently, the argument from the immateriali-
ty of the soul's power of intellection fails to philosophically demonstrate the 
immortality of the soups In order to live while disembodied, the soul must 
be capable of exercising at least one of its acts / powers in separation from 
the body and, although preternaturally the soul will be supplied an alterna-
tive to phantasms for its intellectual activity, it cannot be philosophically 
demonstrated that this will be the case.26 
We are now in a position to understand why Aquinas sets forth that "if 
the resurrection of the body be denied it is not easy, in fact it is difficult, to 
maintain the immortality of the soul" and, also, why he could not have 
maintained that the human soul is the proper subject of the perfection of 
life. While he could argue on philosophical grounds that the human soul 
does not lose its being at physical death, and perhaps even that in such a 
state the soul would have a different mode of being, he could not guaran-
tee on philosophical grounds that the separated soul would exercise a vital 
activity like intellection. That guarantee is provided by the final purpose of 
the separated state, viz. the resurrection of the body. 
III. Conclusion 
Aquinas's philosophical principles place him in a very awkward situation 
with respect to the immortality of the human soul: he can philosophically 
maintain that the soul will be continue to exist in a different mode after 
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physical death but not that it will be supplied an alternative to the phan-
tasms it requires in order to exercise its vital activity of intellection. The 
tenet that the soul will be supplied with an alternative to phantasms and, 
consequently, that it will actually exercise a vital activity in the separated 
state is theological, not philosophical. Aquinas's position on the immortali-
ty of the soul truly strains the limits of philosophy: as much as immortality 
is strongly suggested, even implied, by Aquinas's philosophical principles, 
it is only assured by a truth of faith. As Aquinas respects the boundary 
between faith and reason in his arguments concerned with whether the 
human soul is corrupted at physical death, we should follow suit and cease 
claiming that he offers philosophical demonstrations of the immortality of 
the human soul. 
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"Si autem ponamus quod anima ex sua natura habeat ut intelligat convertendo 
se ad phantasmata, cum natura animae post mortem corporis non mutetur, 
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siderandum est quod cum nihil operetur nisi in quantum est actu, modus 
operandi uniuscuiusque rei sequitur modum essendi ipsius. Habet autem 
anima alium modum essendi cum unitur corpori, et cum fuerit a corpore sepa-
rata, manente tamen eadem animae natura; [ ... ] Animae igitur secundum ilIum 
modum essendi quo corpori est unita, competit modus intelligendi per conver-
sionem ad phantasmata corporum, quae in corporeis organis sunt; cum autem 
fuerit a corpore separata, competit ei modus intelligendi per conversionem ad 
ea quae sunt intelligibilia simpliciter, sicut et aliis substantiis separatis." 
23. See, for instance, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 89, art. 1, in corp. (Ottawa edi-
tion, p. 550b): "Unde modus intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata est 
ani mae naturalis, sicut et corpori uniri; sed esse separatam a corpore est 
praeter rationem suae naturae, et similiter intelligere sine conversione ad phan-
tasmata est ei praeter naturam." 
24. Summa theologiae, I, q. 89, art. 1, in corp. (Ottawa edition, p. 550b): 
"Unde modus intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata est animae natu-
ralis, sicut et corpori uniri; sed esse separatam a corpore est praeter rationem 
suae naturae, et similiter intelligere sine conversione ad phantasmata est ei 
praeter naturam." 
25. It is interesting to note that the difficulty caused by Aristotle's require-
ment of phantasms for human thinking gave rise to a controversy at the begin-
ning of the 16th century and that Cajetan, while granting that the incorruptibili-
ty of the human soul is philosophically demonstrable, came to deny that the 
soul's immortality is philosophically demonstrable. These two points are men-
tioned by Joseph Owens in his" Aquinas on the Inseparability ... ," pp. 268-269 
and it is to him that we owe the following references: regarding the controv..er-
sy over the Aristotelian requirement of phantasms for human thinking, see Eti-
enne Gilson's "Autour de Pomponazzi. Problematique de l'immortalite de 
l'ime en Italie au debut du XVIe siecle," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire 
du moyen age 28 (1961): 163-279; and for references to passages in Cajetan's 
works, see John P. Reilly's Cajetan's Notion of Existence, (Paris/The Hague: 
Vrin/Martinus Njihoff, 1971), pp. 95-102, esp. 99-100. 
26. This is acknowledged by Joseph Owens in his" Aquinas on the 
Inseparability ... ," p. 268. 
